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Abstract 
The increasing number of mobile device users indicates the expansion of personalized location-based services (LBS). Despite 
their proliferation, the risk of violating users’ privacy by exposing user’s location information remains. For this reason, many 
studies have researched to prevent privacy violation in LBS. However, previous researches only focused on protecting users’ 
location information without considering semantic location privacy violation through contextual information. In this paper, we 
explain the process of inferring a user’s behavior using semantic information which includes spatial and temporal information. 
We also suggest a privacy preserving technique to prevent exposure of sensitive behavior in semantic LBS. We implement an 
android application to validate the proposed technique. In accordance with the experimental results, the proposed b-diversity 
technique is validated to prevent exposure of sensitive behavior and also minimizing data utilization degradation. 
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1. Introduction 
The growing number of mobile devices users and the development of wireless network have given rise to various 
personalized services. Location-based services (LBS) have gained popularity by providing personalization services 
such as navigation, online social networks and point of interest (POI) search. However, LBS have risk to expose a 
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user’s location history and contextual information to malicious adversary. For instance, user’s political beliefs can be 
inferred by specific information such as duration of stay in a specific building occupied by political parties. 
Therefore, in order to provide safe and reliable location-based services, user’s privacy should be guaranteed. 
Numerous researches have been studied to solve the privacy issues arising from the use of LBS. Existing research 
to protect the location privacy can be classified into policy-based technique and inference prevention techniques. 
The policy-based technique is used to reflect the user agreement and privacy setting to decide level of information 
disclosure. Inference prevention technique is applied to prevent inference of sensitive information that the user does 
not want the public to expose. The inference prevention technique can be further categorized into three types, 
namely, identity privacy, location privacy, and semantic location privacy. 
Identity privacy protection prevents the identification of a user who uses LBS and location privacy protection is 
the research to prevent to expose the exact position of the LBS user. Semantic location privacy protection 9-11 
prevents the exposure of a user’s contextual information associated with location information. Semantic location 
privacy protection is different from identity privacy and location privacy because the former considers location or 
identification information and contextual information, such as user’s behavioral information. However, research on 
semantic location privacy technique is not yet studied sufficiently. 
In this paper, we focus on a privacy protection technique to prevent the exposure of the sensitive behavioral 
information in semantic LBS. This technique uses the spatial and contextual information of the user to provide a 
personalized service. We propose a b-diversity method to reduce the probability of sensitive behavior inference to 
1/b by maintaining b or more candidate behavior that can be inferred. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews existing LBS privacy and semantic 
location privacy techniques. Section 3 introduces the proposed b-diversity method and algorithm. Section 4 explains 
our experiment to validate the proposed technique. The last section summarizes the contributions of this paper and 
our future work. 
2. Related works 
2.1. Location privacy preserving techniques 
Privacy preserving techniques in LBS are classified into location anonymization which hides a user’s exact 
location information, and identity anonymization which prevents user identification. Location k-anonymity takes k-1 
other user’s locations to reduce the possibility of pinpointing a user’s exact location. This method is the most 
popular technique for location anonymization. Location anonymization techniques are further classified into spatial 
cloaking1,2,3, space transformation4,5, and fake location6,7. 
Spatial cloaking has been widely used to tackle privacy issues in LBS. The basic idea of spatial cloaking 
techniques is to blur or generalize a user’s exact location into a cloaked area to satisfy location k-anonymity. Spatial 
cloaking is a simple technique; however it deteriorates the quality of service and require additional computation 
cost. Space transformation is a method that transforms a user’s location into another space to hide his/her location, 
while maintaining the spatial relationship. This method is more efficient than spatial cloaking; however the 
calculations involved are complex, and are unable to support various query types, such as range query. Fake location 
technique sends dummy, false location information, to the LBS provider to conceal a user’s location. The fake 
location does not deteriorate the quality of service, but disclosing dummy information is possible. Moreover, the 
creation and management of dummies is expensive.  
Identity anonymization8 uses pseudonyms to prevent user identification by hiding information, such as name and 
Social Security Number (SSN). However, if a certain pseudonym is used for a long time, it can eventually be 
inferred. A previous work8 has introduced the concept of mix zones. A mix zone is an area that assigns new 
pseudonyms without exposing the relationship between the user’s old and new pseudonyms.2.2  
2.2. Semantic location privacy 
In an LBS service environment, semantic location is defined to generate new semantic information comprising 
user preferences and contextual information on specific space. LBS using semantic location can provide various 
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personalized services that reflect the tastes and preferences of individual users. However, the increase in 
personalization also increases privacy violation risks. 
To ensure privacy protection of semantic location, a previous work9 has proposed cloaking technique that 
satisfies a user’s privacy preference. In this study, the probability of a user’s location and sensitivity threshold is 
considered when deciding one the cloaking area. Yigitoglu10 proposed a cloaking technique that consider the road 
and rail network. This technique is distinct from other existing techniques have no limitation for object movement; it 
also considers contextual information such as location type and minimum time to reach specific location. It creates 
cloaking region by calculating the sensitivity and probability of specific locations. Lee11 regards residence time as a 
characteristic of the semantic location and presents a cloaking area generation technique to prevent the inference of 
the user’s exact location. This method assumes that the purpose of one’s to a location can be inferred based on the 
residence time. For instance, visiting a restaurant for a meal usually takes 1 to 2 hours, and staying in school to 
attend classes takes 5 to 6 hours. Lee11 proposed a technique for generating a clocking area that can prevent to infer 
the purpose of visit the place through the difference of residence time. 
Existing LBS privacy preserving techniques aim to prevent identification and location information leakage. 
However, semantic location privacy focuses on preventing user’s semantic information exposure such as behavioral 
information of purpose of visit. Consequently, existing LBS privacy protection technique cannot be applied to 
semantic location privacy. 
In this paper, we propose a semantic location privacy preserving technique that generates cloaking area using 
user’s context including spatial and temporal information. This technique is used to prevent inferences with respect 
to user’s sensitive behavior that user want to keep private. 
3. Privacy preserving technique for semantic location 
3.1. Motivation 
In general, each location has a unique behavior based on location’s type. For instance, specific behavior that 
related with health care occurs in hospitals. In government offices, public service activities are performed. Each 
unique behavior has a pattern, such as residence time, frequency, in/out time, and unique behaviors, which can be 
distinguished using these patterns. For instance, if a certain user’s residence time pattern is usually 6 hours and his 
in/out time pattern is 09:00 to 18:00, we can infer that the user is someone who performs medical related work. 
Hence, the unique behavior is determined by the location type, and such behaviors can be inferred based on their 
own pattern. Table 1 presents an example of unique behaviors in the medical area, a field that is considered to be 
sensitive to issues. This table is obtained from a survey in the medical field. 
Table 1 An example of unique behaviors in the hospital 
Unique behavior In/out time Residence time Frequency 
Visit for medical treatment by patients 09:00-18:00 2-4 hour Aperiodic 
Visits as doctor 00:00-24:00 Almost 10 hour Periodic 
Visits as nurse 00:00-24:00 Almost 8 hour Periodic 
Patients admitted to hospital 00:00-24:00 24 hours Aperiodic 
Visit for medical receptionist 09:00-18:00 1 hours Aperiodic 
 
Personalized services based on the semantic location of the user can allow managers to infer the users’ unique 
behavior. It is possible to provide a convenient personalized service, but at the same time, this inference occur 
serious privacy violation. Therefore, semantic location privacy preserving technique which can control the degree of 
a user’s behavior exposure, is required. 
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3.2. Basic scheme 
Lee11 has presented the possibility of inferring a user’s current location using residence time pattern; it also 
proposes a cloaking algorithm to prevent the exposure of the user’s location to be inferred. This method attempts to 
prevent the expose of the user’s location. However, inference of a unique behavior in a specific location might be 
more dangerous than disclosure of location. In this paper, we define various unique behaviors in a semantic location. 
Then, the sensitivity of unique behavior is set by a user in specific location to meet each user’s different privacy 
requirements. We use a decision tree algorithm to infer unique behavior using collected information and apply the 
proposed b-diversity method to prevent sensitive behavior.  An overview of the proposed technique is shown as 
follows. 
 
Fig.1. Overview of the proposed technique 
We assume that the generation of a decision tree is performed by a trusted third party. The resulting decision tree 
is broadcasted to each user’s mobile device. The decision tree can be generated by distributed method using SMC 
without a  trusted third party; however we provide no detailed explanation here because it is beyond the scope of this 
study. The user infers her behavior before reporting her information to the LBS provider. If the classification result 
is classified as sensitive behavior, the user adds noise or creates cloaking area to hide the sensitive behavior from the 
LBS provider. 
3.3.  Decision tree generation for behavior classification 
The decision tree, which represents as a tree-like structure, analyzes data to generate a rule for classification. 
Using the decision tree algorithm has several advantages. First, this method is easy to understand because it provides 
clear reason for the classification. Second, when data have too many attributes, the decision tree can automatically 
and efficiently exclude the attributes that do not affect the results. In addition, this method can save time and effort 
because it can process data without transforming data value.  
Several decision tree algorithms depend on the utility function such as ID3, CART, CHAID, C5.0. In this paper, 
we have chosen the ID3 algorithm, which uses information entropy to calculate information gain, because this is 
typically used to generate the decision tree. Clearly, other decision tree algorithms can be used.  
We implemented an android application to collect data including spatial and temporal information. We collected 
contextual information from 10 users for 10 days. The collected data samples are listed in table 2. 
Table 2 An example of collected data 
Type of location Residence Time Time slot Day of week Latitude Longitude Time 
Education 1hour Afternoon Thur. 37.55 126.94 17:42 
Restaurant 1 hour Evening Fri. 37.49 127.13 20:29 
Café 2 hour Evening Sat. 37.48 127.03 20:52 
Office 2 hour Morning Sun. 37.494 127.12 10:35 
 
To generate the decision tree, each user manually attaches a label as behavior information to their collected data 
via application. This method generates additional cognitive cost; hence frequency and granularity of input label 
should be adjusted for service environment. When labeling the behavior, the user also inputs sensitivity of behavior 
to their data. The sensitivity scale is 1 to 10. In this scale, 1 means the lowest sensitivity and 10 represent the highest 
sensitivity value. Sensitivity value of behavior is used to calculate the average sensitivity of each behavior. We 
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predefine a set of possible behaviors for labeling. If the user wants to input other behaviors that are not predefined, 
they can input the label manually. We generate decision trees based on the collected data, as shown in is Fig.2 
 
 
Fig. 2. Decision tree based on collected data 
3.4. Classification using decision tree 
Some behaviors classified using the decision tree are considered user sensitive. The proposed technique focuses 
on preventing the exposure of sensitive behavior in specific locations. For instance, we assume that Alice knows that 
her behavior is inferred by her data using a decision tree [Table 3]. Alice does not care about the exposure of 
location information such as school for learning or pub for social activity. However, she wants to prevent exposure 
of her sensitive behavior such as hospital visiont to take medical treatment. The existing cloaking method simply 
attempts to protect her location privacy. Hence, this method is inappropriate to meet her requirement. Additionally, 
the cloaking method can lead to an extreme deterioration of data utilization. 
Table 3 Classified behavior of Alice 
Type of location Residence Time Time slot Day of week Time Behavior 
Hospital 2 hours Morning Thur. 10:35 Medical treatment 
Hospital 6 hours Afternoon Fri. 15:29 Medical treatment 
School 5 hours Morning Sat. 10:52 Learning 
Pub 2 hours Night Sun. 20:35 Social activity 
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3.5. Classification using decision tree 
Behavior sensitivity 
Behavior sensitivity is used to estimate the degree of behavior’s privacy.  As we have explained in section 3.3, the 
sensitivity of each behavior is calculated based on user input. Every behavior has a default sensitivity value, which 
is the average of the entire range of sensitivity values displayed by the user. In addition, users can change default 
sensitivity value to reflect his privacy preference and even set the sensitivity threshold. If the inferred behavior’s 
sensitivity value exceeds the sensitivity threshold, the behavior is defined as sensitive behavior, and b-diversity is 
applied to prevent the exposure of such sensitive behavior. 
The b-diversity algorithm 
If the sensitive behavior, which exceeds the sensitivity threshold, is inferred by the decision tree, then the 
proposed b-diversity method adds noise to user’s spatial and temporal data to infer other b-1 behaviors using 
decision tree. The value of the average sensitivity of the inferred behavior should be less than that of the sensitivity 
threshold. Adding noise to infer other b-1 behaviors results in the reduction of the probability of exact behavior 
inferred less than 1/b. In this paper, we named proposed technique as the b-diversity. 
Definition 1. b(behavior)-diversity 
The proposed b-diversity is used to protect a user’s semantic location privacy by adding noise or generating 
cloaking area to infer b or more behaviors, which reduces the probability that user’s behavior can be inferred  to less 
than 1/b. 
 
Generating cloaking area significantly decreases data utility in LBS. However, existing location privacy 
protection techniques, including semantic location privacy, simply use the cloaking method to preserve privacy. The 
proposed b-diversity technique adds noise to infer other b-1 behaviors before generating the cloaking area to prevent 
exposure of sensitive behavior. This proposed technique can reduce data utilization by constraining cloaking area 
generation. The b-diversity algorithms is presented below. 
 
1. The user checks whether the inferred behavior exceeds the sensitivity threshold before sending data to the LBS 
provider. If the inferred behavior is non-sensitive, the user reports data to the LBS provider. If  the behavior is 
sensitive, the user applies b-diversity algorithm to prevent exposure of such sensitive behavior. 
2. The b-diversity algorithm initially attempts to selects the inferred behavior’s sibling behavior in decision tree, in 
accordance with an ascending order of sensitivity value, in order to decrease average sensitive of behaviors.  
3. The proposed algorithm adds noise according to the decision rule to generate more data than those inferred from 
the b-1 inferred behavior.  
4. If no sibling behavior is observed, and the average sensitivity value is less than the threshold, we attempt to find 
another behavior to meet the threshold constraint in the parent node. 
5. If the decision rule’s attribute is the location attribute, then no candidate behavior is added in the current location. 
In this case, we generate the cloaking area to find the candidate behavior in another location. 
6. Steps 2 and 5 are repeated until more b-1 behaviors are found to satisfy the threshold constraint. 
 
In the b-diversity algorithm, the value of b and the sensitivity threshold affect the data utility and privacy 
protection. As their values become increasingly larger and larger, the privacy protection degree increases. However, 
this degree deteriorates data utility by adding noise and generating the cloaking area. Hence, the values of b and 
sensitive threshold should be determined by considering a trade-off between data utility and degree of privacy 
protection degree. 
324   Yuna Oh et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  35 ( 2014 )  318 – 327 
 
Fig. 3. The proposed b-diversity algorithm 
4. Experiment 
4.1. Experimental purpose 
In this chapter, we validate whether the proposed technique can guarantee sufficient semantic location privacy 
protection and minimize data utilization degradation. We compared the proposed technique to [11], in terms of 
privacy protection and data utilization.  We carried out three experimental evaluations. (1) cloaking area size by 
increasing sensitivity threshold, (2) cloaking area size by increasing number of sensitive behavior, and (3) cloaking 
area size by number of b. Cloaking area is significantly related with data utility and privacy protection. Hence, we 
compared the cloaking area size between existing semantic location privacy protection technique and proposed 
technique. 
4.2. Experimental purpose 
We performed the experiment using Intel® Core™ i5 3.1GHz CPU, 3GB RAM, and Windows 7 Home Premium 
K SP1. We implemented the Android application to collect the users’ context information, including spatial and 
temporal information. We released our application to 10 people, and collected their information for 10 days 
automatically via released application. Fig. 3 shows an application interface and collected location information of 
users. We generated the decision tree using ID3 algorithm. We evaluate the accuracy of the decision tree by 
comparing a user’s real behavior and classified behavior using the decision tree. Upon evaluation, the average 
accuracy of the generated decision tree is found to be 69.55%. 
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Fig.4. Collected user data and Android application for data collection 
4.3. Experimental purpose 
To validate the data utility of the proposed technique, we compared our technique to Lee11 in terms of cloaking 
area size. Then, we evaluated the cloaking area size by increasing sensitivity threshold. The experiment result is 
shown in the left side of Fig.5, in which the X axis indicates sensitivity value threshold, and the Y axis represents 
the ratio of cloaking area size. Experiment result shows that the proposed technique’s cloaking area size is 52.78% 
less than that in Lee11. In Lee11, the authors generated cloaking area for the protection of the location privacy. 
However, the proposed technique adds noise to satisfy b-diversity. If b-diversity cannot be satisfied by adding noise, 
then the cloaking area is generated. Therefore, the proposed technique can prevent the increase of cloaking area size 
while minimizing data utility deterioration for privacy protection. 
4.4. Experimental purpose 
We evaluate the cloaking area size by increasing the number of sensitive behavior. We compare the proposed 
technique to Lee11. The experiment result is shown in the right side of Fig.5, in which X axis indicates the number of 
sensitive behavior/number of whole behavior, and the Y axis represents the ratio of cloaking area size. When the 
sensitive behavior ratio is 90%, the proposed technique’s cloaking area size is 48% less than Lee11 because the 
proposed technique considers b-diversity before generating the cloaking area. In LBS, location is the most 
significant factor for data utility. Hence the proposed technique prevents data utility degradation when the user 



















Fig. 5. Cloaking area size by increasing sensitivity threshold and ratio of sensitive behavior 
4.5. Cloaking area size by increasing the number of b 
We evaluated the cloaking area size by increasing the number of b, and the experiment result is shown in Fig. 6. 
We find that when b-diversity is 5, cloaking area size increases rapidly. On average, the number of candidate 
behavior is 4. If b is more than 4, it is more difficult to add noise in order to satisfy b-diversity. Consequently, the 
proposed technique generates cloaking area to meet the b-diversity requirement. We should select the b value 
depending on the average number of candidate behavior, because cloaking area generation significantly degrades 
data utilization. 
 
Fig. 6. Cloaking area size by increasing number of b 
5. Conclusion 
LBS have become more popular because of the increasing number of mobile device user. However, privacy 
violation using location information remains as the crucial weakness of LBS proliferation. Semantic location 
information considers a user’s preference or context information, which is useful in providing personalized LBS. 
However, semantic location privacy protection remains insufficiently studied despite the risks involved in exposing 
user’s location or identification information. Our contributions in this paper are as follows. First, we consider 
various spatial and temporal factors of semantic location information to preserve a user’s privacy violation. Second, 
we propose the b-diversity technique to prevent the exposure of sensitive user behavior while minimizing data utility 
deterioration. To apply the proposed technique, we need additional cost and trusted third party server to generate 
and maintain the decision tree. However, such cost is reasonable when considering the need to preserve user privacy 
in LBS. In our future work, we will extend proposed technique to consider relationship among companions and 
location trace of each user. By these considerations, we can cover more various semantic location information that 
we should protect. 
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